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THE IMF's ROLE IN A POST-CONFLICT SITUATION *

Sean Hagan t
The International Monetary Fund (the "IMF") is frequently called
upon to assist countries facing financial crises, and recent experience demonstrates the extent to which such crises can be precipitated by a civil war
or an international conflict. In some cases, conflicts have resulted in the
establishment of a new government facing enormous challenges in the area
of economic reconstruction. Iraq is recent notable example. In other cases,
the conflict can actually involve the dissolution of a state, as was the case
with the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In all these circumstances,
the Fund provides financial and technical assistance in support of reforms
designed to achieve macroeconomic adjustment and sustainable economic
growth. Not surprisingly, in circumstances where these reforms are being
introduced in a post-conflict situation, such measures include legal and institutional reforms.
Before discussing in greater detail the nature of the assistance we
typically provide in these areas, I would like to identify an issue that has
arisen in this context that is of general relevance from an international law
perspective. As has been demonstrated over the years, circumstances may
arise where the sovereign debt of a country may become unsustainable; i.e.
where there is no feasible set of macroeconomic policies that would enable
the country to resolve its crisis and regain medium term viability without a
significant reduction in the net present value of its debt. However, care
needs to be taken to ensure that any actions in this area does not result in the
introduction of a doctrine of "odious debt", a doctrine that could have severe consequences for access by emerging market and developing countries
to future financing.
The concept of state continuity is one of the most fundamental principles of international law. As a general matter, a state's rights and obligations under international law are not interrupted by a change in government
(or the establishment of a new constitution). For this reason, a new govern* Presented at the "Rebuilding Nation Building" Symposium at Case Western Reserve
University School of Law, co-sponsored by the Frederick K. Cox International Law Center
and the Center for the Interdisciplinary Study of Conflict & Dispute Resolution, on Friday,
Apr. 8, 2005.
t Sean Hagan is General Counsel and Director of the Legal Department at the International Monetary Fund. The views expressed in this essay are those of the author and do not
necessarily reflect the views of the IMF.
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ment is generally bound by the debt obligations of the preceding government, whether such debt is owed to private creditors, official bilateral creditors, or international organizations.' Although attempts have been made to
establish exceptions to the state continuity doctrine for "odious" debts incurred by predecessor regimes, these attempts have not been successful. For
example, in 1996, Iran requested the U.S.-Iran Claims Tribunal to invalidate
debt contracted by the previous government with the United States on the
grounds that such debt was "odious" and, therefore, was not transferable to
the Islamic Republic of Iran. The Tribunal rejected this argument, stating
that international law2 did not allow for such an exception to the general
concept of continuity.
One of the reasons why the "odious debt" doctrine has not become
a well-established principle under international law is that, being both
difficult to define and to implement, there is a concern that it will create
considerable uncertainty in the international financial system. Is debt odious
simply because it is judged to be immoral by the successor regime? Or is it
odious because it is inconsistent with some standard established by the
international community? If the latter criterion applies, which institution
will be responsible for making this judgment? From a policy perspective,
the introduction of an "odious debt" exception would most likely do
considerable damage to the capacity of developing countries to borrow
responsibly and access to capital markets. When faced with the possibility
that debt that has been legally contracted could be nullified ex post on the
grounds that its proceeds were used for purposes that may be considered
immoral by the successor regime, investors will be less willing to either
provide new financing or purchase claims on the secondary market. 3
As indicated earlier, there may be circumstances where creditorsboth private creditors and official bilateral creditors-will have no choice
1 The international law principles applicable to changes in government should be distinguished from those relating to state succession. In the former case, the state continues to exist
and its rights and obligations remain unaltered. In the case of state succession, however, a
new state emerges. The responsibility of the new state for all of the debt owed by the predecessor is complicated by a number of factors, including the fact that there may be more than
one successor state; e.g., the successor states of the former Yugoslavia. Although the concept
of odious debt has been given greater consideration in the context of state succession, it has
not been recognized by the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of State
Property, Archives and Debt.
2 United States v. Iran, 32 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 162, Award No. 574-B36-2 (Dec. 3,
1996).
3 The concept of "odious debt" needs to be distinguished from debt that has been illegally
contracted. Where a government official signing a debt agreement has not obtained the necessary authorization that is required under domestic law, the state will not be bound by such
an undertaking if the creditor knew-or should have known-that proper authorization had
not been obtained.
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but to agree to a reduction in the net present value of their claims given the
economic circumstances of the sovereign debtor. Consistent with existing
practice, however, whether this is necessary should be based on an assessment of the sustainability of the country's debt and the amount of reduction
should be negotiated between sovereign debtor and its creditors.
Turning to the type of assistance that is provided by the Fund in
these circumstances, the Fund has established a financing facility that is
specifically designed to assist member countries that are emerging from
conflict situations. Referred to as Emergency Post-Conflict Assistance
("EPCA"), the Fund is prepared to provide financing to a country in a postconflict situation in circumstances where, as a result of the conflict, the
country's institutional and administrative capacity has been disrupted and,
accordingly, it is not in position to develop a and implement a comprehensive economic program that could be supported by a more traditional IMF
arrangement. Nevertheless, as a condition for receiving support from the
Fund, the member would need to demonstrate sufficient capacity for planning and policy implementation, which would normally be evidenced
through the establishment of a quantified macroeconomic framework. The
financing provided under EPCA, which may not exceed fifty percent of a
member's quota in the IMF, is designed not only to rebuild reserves and
help the country meet essential external payments, but also to generate support from other official sources. Consistent with its traditional "catalytic"
role, Fund support for an economic program is designed, in part, to encourage other donors or creditors to provide assistance.
In addition to its financial support, the IMF also provides a considerable amount of technical assistance to its members, a service that it typically provides free of charge. In the post-conflict context, such assistance
has involved helping countries develop--or reconstruct-the legal and institutional framework that underpins the operation of a market economy. Areas where the Fund is particularly active include central and commercial
banking, taxation, insolvency and payments systems. For example, over the
past two years the Fund has provided extensive technical assistance to Iraq,
helping it prepare its new currency legislation and its new central bank and
commercial banking laws. Of course, experience demonstrates the effectiveness of any legal framework depends on the quality of the institutions
that are charged with implementing these laws. Reforming weak institutions
is a long term process and an area where other international institutions-and, in particular, the World Bank-play a pivotal role. For this reason, it
gives me great pleasure to participate in this symposium with Ms. Linn
Hammergren, who has a wealth of valuable experience in the area of judicial reform.

LATIN AMERICAN EXPERIENCE WITH RULE OF LAW REFORMS AND ITS
APPLICABILITY TO NATION BUILDING EFFORTS

Linn Hammergren t
I. INTRODUCTION

In the early 1980s, the Latin American region began a judicial and
rule of law movement that has lasted till this day. This was not the first time
the region had seen this kind of cross-national effort to improve the justice
sector,' but it does represent the most concerted, self-conscious, and sustained example in its history.2 One reason for this difference is doubtless the
participation of foreign donors (bilateral and multilateral agencies working
with grants, loans, and supervision missions) and the involvement of a variety of civil society, advocacy, and special interest organizations from outside the region. 3 Over the twenty year period, the combined efforts of national and international actors have substantially changed the shape and
political weight of the sectors' organizations (first courts, but then a variety
of other public and private actors), altered the legal framework, and brought
sector operations to public attention. Whether this has improved performance is another question. Although their observations differ substantially,
• Presented at the "Rebuilding Nation Building" Symposium at Case Western Reserve
University School of Law, co-sponsored by the Frederick K. Cox International Law Center
and the Center for the Interdisciplinary Study of Conflict & Dispute Resolution, on Friday,
Apr. 8, 2005.
t Linn Hammergren is Senior Public Sector Management Specialist, Latin America Regional Department at the World Bank. The opinions expressed here are those of the author
and do not in any way reflect the official policy of the World Bank.
1 This term is increasingly used to denote the shift from purely judicial to related types of
legal and institutional reform. What is included in the justice sector remains a matter of debate, but as I will focus on the core organizations, I don't intend to pursue that issue here.
2 In the 1960s and 1970s various Latin American countries had received donor assistance
under the Law and Development movement. See, e.g., JAMES A. GARDNER, LEGAL
IMPERIALISM: AMERICAN LAWYERS AND FOREIGN AID IN LATIN AMERICA 53 (1980). While
beginning as an attempt to update methods for teaching law, the program eventually incorporated many of the themes (and individuals) of the post-1980 experience. Throughout their
independent history, the region's nations have undergone, often simultaneously or sequentially, various waves of updating codes. Since the 1960s there had been a regional group
dedicated to promoting model codes. JAVIER LLOBET RODRIGUEZ, LA REFORMA PROCESAL
PENAL (1993).

3 By special interest organizations, I mean entities like the international arms of the ABA,
the AFL-CIO, and other domestic associations that took their programs afield.
0
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none, I believe, would say that the answer is absolutely "no." The question
is just whether the improvements achieved matched the resources invested,
whether more could have been accomplished, and whether what has not
been achieved is more likely to occur now, building on the foundations already established.
Most of these efforts did not occur in a "state" or "nation-building
context," that is to say, in a situation where political society had collapsed
and was being rebuilt, or where the very existence of a nation was contested
by a substantial portion of its population. In fact, the one case that most
closely approximates that model, Haiti in the second half of the 1990s, is the
one universally considered a failure. However, there are other examples of
operations in post-conflict countries (if not collapsed societies) where the
results have been more positive, and in any case, the entire experience is
relevant for nation-building efforts because it has become a model for all
rule of law programs, including those in countries embarked on constructing
or reconstructing their national identity or state.
As I know the Latin American experience well but have far less familiarity with contemporary nation building efforts, I will have to divide
this essay into several parts: a first section reviewing the context and the
efforts in the majority of Latin American reforms; a second looking at the
Latin American experience that comes closest to a nation building effort;
and a third, and most speculative, attempting to tease out the lessons for
other regions and other challenges. I would only note in passing that although nation and state building were not considered problems at the initiation of the region wide reforms, they are in some sense emerging issues
now. In several of the region's countries, indigenous ethnic groups have
begun to demand a reinterpretation of the national identity to include a
multi-cultural component, and in these and others, many pre-existing notions about the nature of the state are also being called into question. The
level of violence and the threats of dissolution of former national pacts associated with these movements are still not great, and probably will not become so. In any event, the recent events do suggest that such questions are
rarely resolved once and for all.
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II. THE POST-1980 LATIN AMERICAN RULE OF LAW REFORMS AND THE
CONTEXT IN WHICH THEY HAVE OPERATED4

Most observers agree that these reforms emerged as part of the
nearly region-wide democratic opening, following a period in which the
majority of the region's countries operated under military or militarycivilian dictatorships. In some countries, resistance to these regimes had
taken a fairly violent form, producing open civil wars in Nicaragua, El
Salvador, and Guatemala; militant resistance movements in the Southern
Cone and Brazil; and sporadic outbreaks of violence or civil disorder in
many of the other countries. Ironically, among the countries escaping that
characterization, two-Colombia and Venezuela-entered into periods of
chaos and violence later.5 To be fair, they may simply be harbingers of a
still later, in fact contemporary, regional trend toward the reopening of
conflicts presumably resolved decades before. It should be noted as well,
that Latin America's nation building crisis was faced far earlier, from the
first part of the 19th century until roughly the mid 1850s. With the
exception of sporadic millennialist campaigns and some contemporary ethic
movements (which no one yet sees as threatening national unity), the
national identity of all the region's countries has not since been in question.
Instead political battles have tended to focus on the nature of the state (how
it would operate, what it would do, how powers would be divided among
the parts), and control of whatever state apparatus existed at any given time.
These are important questions, especially in a region with one of the highest
levels of inequality in the world, but at least they were made easier by the
prior acceptance of the definition of the nation. Latin America's recent
crises, even the few raising issues of national identity, have likewise been
precipitated by the discontent of key sectors of the population with how the
state operates and what benefits it provides to whom. This is true; it should
be mentioned, even of our prime example of a failed state, Haiti.
4 There is now a large descriptive, analytic, and often critical literature covering these
programs. See, e.g., Jorge Correa Sutil, Judicial Reforms in Latin America: Good News for
the Underprivileged?,in THE (UN)RULE OF LAW & THE UNDERPRIVILEGED IN LATIN AMERICA
255-277 (Juan E. Mendez et. al. eds., 1999); RULE OF LAW IN LATIN AMERICA: THE
INTERNATIONAL PROMOTION OF JUDICIAL REFORM (Pilar Domingo & Rachel Seider eds.,
2001); LINN A. HAMMERGREN, THE POLITICS OF JUSTICE AND JUSTICE REFORM IN LATIN
AMERICA (1998); Linn Hammergren, International Assistance to Latin American Justice
Programs: Toward an Agenda for Reforming the Reformers, in BEYOND COMMON
KNOWLEDGE: EMPIRICAL APPROACHES TO THE RULE OF LAW (Erik Jensen & Thomas Heller
eds., 2003); WILLIAM C. PRILLAMAN, THE JUDICIARY AND DEMOCRATIC DECAY IN LATIN
AMERICA (2000); MARK UNGER, ELUSIVE REFORM: DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW IN

LATIN AMERICA (2002), among others.
5 Colombia in some sense experienced the "transition" violence earlier, in the midtwentieth century civil war called "la Violencia," and the following three-year dictatorship
under Rojas Pinilla.
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Within this context, the post-1980 rule of law movement must be
seen as part of a general effort at state reform. It was accompanied in most
countries by the rewriting of constitutions to reverse prior presidential centralism, recognize more political and civil rights, and dedicate state efforts
to resolution of social problems. Many of the constitutions of this era (and
some from before where the military dictatorship took a leftist bent), 6 defined a social market or social welfare state (estado de bien estar social),
incorporating a long series of second and third generation rights to which
citizens or, in fact, any resident was entitled. They generally enhanced the
courts' role in ruling on the constitutionality of laws and government actions, increased the mechanisms through which aggrieved citizens could
access their rights, and attempted to enhance judicial independence through
guaranteed budgets, new appointment and career systems, tenure in office
until retirement, and a prohibition on reducing judicial salaries. Judicial
governance was entrusted either to the Supreme Court or a Judicial Council.
In the few countries (Argentina, Colombia, and to a lesser extent, Peru)
where the Ministry of Justice had played any role in governance or appointments, its participation was eliminated. Haiti here remains the sole, and
major exception. Simultaneously, there was a drive toward reforming criminal justice systems, long the subject of criticisms, but especially objected to
because of their use by authoritarian regimes to repress opposition, and the
belief that poor citizens suffered disproportionately from their "normal"
operations-that is to say they were universally the "usual suspects" and
when they were the victims of crimes, they were most often ignored.7
Although donors were aware of these problems, and had an interest
in addressing them, the solutions tended to come out of the national environment, usually forwarded by groups of concerned jurists who had been
waiting for some time for an opportunity to introduce the changes. Most of
the designers were independent scholars, not members of the state judicial
apparatus. Judges and other sector officials were usually seen as products of
a problematic system, often were not all that interested in reform, and had
they been, were discredited by their suspect origins and actions. The criminal and criminal procedure reforms, for example, derived from a movement,
with origins in the 1960s or before, aimed at introducing more accusatory
criminal processes, recognizing due process rights, and altering some basic
understandings about the nature and definitions of criminal actions.8 The
6

Ecuador and Peru during the 1970s are the two examples.

7 See generally THE (UN)RULE OF LAW & THE UNDERPRIVILEGED IN LATIN AMERICA,

supra note 4.
8 See RODRIGUEZ, supra note 2 (for historical discussion), and ALBERTO M. BINDER,
POLiTICA: DE LA FORmuLAcI6N A LA PRAXIS (1997) (for criminal justice goals), and ALBERTO
M. BINDER & JORGE OBANDO, DE LAS "REPUBLICAS AtREAS" AL ESTADO DE DERECHO (2004)
(for criminal justice goals).
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models drew on European and U.S. experience, but very much through the
Latin American lens. Subsequent claims that the U.S. "forced" its criminal
justice models on the region are simply erroneous. It is true that training and
other assistance subsequently offered by the U.S. are based on practices in
that country. Unfortunately, many of these practices are inconsistent with
the revised codes, which in most cases have a more European content. 9
Other measures, the introduction of budgetary earmarks for courts
in particular, the creation of judicial councils to manage the appointment
system and in some cases all judicial governance, or the creation of separate
constitutional courts, were either complete innovations (the earmarks) or
built on local understandings of European developments, in some cases, like
the constitutional tribunals, duplicate provisions and institutional designs
from those of the old continent. Interestingly, in these areas as well, Spanish
speaking Latin America was more influenced by German trends than by
those in Spain, in part because Spanish academics themselves tended to
prefer the German models. There was also a process of sequential imitation.
One Latin American country imitated a European model, and others in turn
imitated the imitation. Like the game of gossip, the imitations grew less
accurate with every round. Also, as is often mentioned, the imitations
tended to pull practices out of a broader context which did not hold in the
adopting country. Selection mechanisms were adopted with no regard for
the larger environment in which they functioned in Europe-the better legal
preparation of candidates, the presence of strong bar associations capable of
disciplining their members, the well established understandings as to what
judges would do and what skills they needed to do it.
Donors were important in introducing additional elementsespecially an emphasis on court administration, delay reduction and automation, judicial training, and eventually alternative dispute resolution
("ADR"), legal aid, and civil society participation. While some of these
additions were strongly resisted by the region's courts, most have come
around to accepting them, in some cases (ADR and automation) with remarkable enthusiasm. Whereas the local input emphasized judicial independence and new procedural rules, donors added the elements of efficiency
and access. Today, the elements have become so merged that no one re9 It is not clear that all the initial local reformers recognized this fact, but they are becoming more sophisticated as to the variety of accusatory models, and the strengths and weaknesses of each. Chile appears to be moving toward a U.S. version, but the majority of the
region's countries can be considered to have more Germanic codes. One very strong Germanic influence is the insistence that the various stages of a criminal trial be overseen by
different judges so as to remove any bias originating in earlier interventions. Paraguay recently added a fourth first-instance judge and now has a judge to oversee the police investigation, one to handle indictment proceedings, one (or a panel) to preside at the trial, and still
another to supervise enforcement of judgments. Here it outdoes even its German mentors.
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members who authored what, and the region now has a fairly standard reform recipe, what some critics have called a template,'0 a list of activities
that seem to figure to a greater or lesser degree in every reform attempted.
Over the ensuing twenty years or so, the experience has transformed
what was once called the "Cinderella" branch of government. Although the
donors financed technical assistance, buildings, and computers, it bears
mentioning that the national governments' investment was far greater, as
they paid for virtually all of the substantially increased operating costs. The
concerted attention and significant investments from all sources have
brought dramatic changes in the structure and operations of the sector,
including:
* Higher budget levels and salaries, especially for the judiciary, but
also for other sector organizations
* Consequent expansion in organizations' national coverage, and
changes in their internal structure
* Changes in the legal framework, aimed at bringing procedural and
substantive laws into line with modern needs and values
* Strengthening of organizational administrative systems, especially
regarding a better means for tracking workflow, budgets, and employees
* Expansion of information made available to the public both for
their own cases and on general operations
* Creation of new organizations-public defense, prosecution, human rights ombudsman, anti-corruption offices, constitutional courts and
chambers
* Provision of alternative services (ADR) including those aimed at
expanding access to the poor in particular (legal assistance, legal information, small claims courts, multi-door services, justice centers, etc)
e In general, more attention to court performance as a result of the
information they release, better media coverage, and the kinds of cases they
are receiving
" Growth in caseloads, changes in types of cases and clients using
courts
" Increased involvement of courts in protecting constitutional rights
and deciding on the constitutionality or legality of executive policies
No one who knew the sector two decades ago, in any of the region's
countries, would deny these changes. Nor would they deny that some of
them represent improvements in their own right. However, the other side of
the coin is that dissatisfaction with sector performance has not disappeared
10 Carothers has used this characterization in many of his presentations on the donorassisted reforms. Thomas Carothers, Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad: The Problem of
Knowledge 8 (Carnegie Endowment for Int'l Peace, Working Paper No. 34, 2003) (offering a
brief and incisive summary of his arguments).
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and may even have worsened. In fact, public opinion surveys conducted
over the past six or seven years show a slight decline from already low levels of public support and confidence." Lacking data from earlier periods,
we cannot say whether this is a recent trend or, still more ominously, a
longer term tendency. Whichever the case, it is also likely that the enormous
publicity given to these reforms and some of the real changes have had their
own negative impact on perceptions. When no one cared about the sector or
expected much from it, it is possible no one had much of an opinion about
it. Today everyone
does, and is well aware, as they were not before, of its
2
many failings.'
III. CRITICISMS OF THE EFFORT AND POSSIBLE NEGATIVE LEGACIES
That the reform efforts begun less than twenty years ago have not
achieved their promoters' most ambitious visions and promises should not
be unexpected. As several have noted, twenty years is not much time to
reverse vices accumulating over nearly 200. Moreover, despite the attention
given by donors, international NGOs, and local champions, these programs
were never national priorities, nor, in the scheme of things, did they receive
an enormous share of external or internal funding. Those not accustomed to
reviewing budgets of assistance programs may regard the latter as a curious
statement, but total donor contributions to regional programs over the
twenty year period may only equal the amount of one year's structural adjustment loans to one of the larger countries. While Latin American judicial
budgets are high as compared to other regions, they never get into two digit
figures, and in most cases are still less than 3 percent of central government
expenditures. However, by the same token, with the exception of the police,
we are looking at small organizations, with relatively few employees and
"service units," which should be easier to turn around than say, a national
education or health system. Thus, any failure to do so or to make what many
regard as a more reasonable degree of progress, cannot be blamed on the
amounts dedicated to the task. The explanation must be sought in other factors. Here we look at two sets of explanations, both relating to how programs were designed, managed, and implemented. The first set comprises
factors affecting all reform efforts, and not only those in justice. The sec-

"
See Pedro Galindo, Indicadores Sujectivos: Estudios, Calificaciones de Riesgo y Encuestas de PercepcirnPzNblica sobre los Sistemas de Justicia. Resultados Recientes par alas
Amiricas, 3 SISTEMAS JUDICIALES 4, 4-35 (2003).
12 Public ratings of the courts, like all public institutions, have also taken a universal nosedive. See Jos& Juan Toharia, Evaluating Systems of Justice Through Public Opinion: Why,
What, Who, How, and What For?, in BEYOND COMMON KNOWLEDGE: EMPIRICAL
APPROACHES TO THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 4 (offering some comparative figures and
some cautions about the use of opinion polls to rate institutional performance).
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ond, while possibly also more generalizable, relates specifically to rule of
law programs.
A. The usualproblems and their usual effects
A few factors, common to reforms in other sectors, deserve some of
the blame for the limited returns: inadequate coordination among the donors
and other external actors; a steep learning curve for those attempting to
work in a wholly new area; frequent changes of leadership within the court
systems and the national executives and their inevitable impact on program
continuity; the external proponents' own shifting agendas and priorities,
even within the sector; and the occasional opportunistic capture of the programs for unrelated or even contradictory ends. I do not plan to spend more
time on these elements than is required to flesh out the telegraphic listing
above.
As regards donor coordination, this is of course mostly a problem in
countries where donors provided the major impetus and where the reforms
wouldn't have occurred, would have occurred much later, or would have
proceeded much less rapidly had donors not been involved. This is the case
for much of Central America, the least developed Andean countries, and
some Caribbean nations. The problem is now recognized, especially as regards the larger donors, but that doesn't make it any easier to fix, owing to
its underlying causes--donors' different structures and operating procedures, internal incentive systems (which put a premium on staff members'
developing their own projects), and the weight of national as well as institutional interests. Donors frequently lay claim to certain countries or regions,
or to certain functional areas, and also have an inevitable preference for
doing things their way. As has been observed repeatedly, this provokes
clashes, redundancies, and even some amazing tactics to undermine each
other's programs. 13 However, the input from the NGO or civil society family should not be overlooked. In attempting to gain a foothold in the process,
they have been equally insistent on doing things their way, on promoting
their often narrow agendas, and on doing whatever it takes to get a piece of
the action (including lobbying with their respective governments and congresses). It is interesting that despite the emphasis on building local capacity, relatively better funded external NGOs sometimes compete, quite successfully, with local organizations for the funds of the larger donors. They
also compete with for-profit consulting firms, and have hardly been adverse
13 See generally HAMMERGREN, supra note 4 (offering some anecdotal examples). See also
Luis Salas, From Law and Development to Rule of Law: New and Old issues in Justice Reform in Latin America, in THE (UN)RULE OF LAW INLATIN AMERICA: TuE INTERNATIONAL
PROMOTION OF JUDICIAL REFORM, supra note 4. (offering a discussion of conflicting agendas
among donors and particularly within the less than monolithic U.S. Government).
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to denigrating the latter's material motives and presumably lesser expertise.' 4 In short, in judicial reform, as in all other areas, altruism is not the
only force at work, and politics and institutional interests work against coordinated efforts as much as some simple structural incompatibilities.
The learning curve phenomenon is often ignored, but as most of
those involved at the beginning would admit, knowledge of how to reform a
judicial sector was virtually zero when the movement got started, and all
parties had to adjust their initial visions considerably over the ensuing
twenty years. On the donor side, the challenge was usually defined over
simplistically, as demonstrated by the first El Salvador project which proposed to resolve the perceived problem of impunity (especially of abusive
state actors) with a judicial protection unit, a forensics laboratory, and training of investigative police. Of course, as the funders quickly recognized,
impunity was hardly the system's only problem, and itself was less a question of inadequate training and tools than of motives, incentives, and the
important interests served. On the local side, a tendency to see the problem
and the challenge as one of inadequate laws, and the solution thus as legal
drafting also took its toll.' 5 An understanding of the complex nature of institutional change has evolved gradually, but operating on this basis continues
to be impeded by the vested interests in routines already developed and the
constant entrance of new actors who often replicate the early mistakes.' 6 It
would certainly help if newcomers (including those in organizations with a
longer track record) paid some attention to the movement's now fairly welldocumented history; but enthusiasm, self-confidence, and the rush to be
included seem to discourage anything so sensible.
Changes in leadership and priorities are also a constant obstacle to
reforms (and also compound the tendency to repeat the same mistakes).
New leaders often want to put their own mark on programs, meaning that
efforts begun by their predecessors may not be followed through. This is
true at all levels, across the board-whether we are talking about donors,
14 See Michael D. Goldhaver, Basics Training, AM. LAW, Nov. 2004, at 107 (offering an
interesting review of the consultant-NGO battle, this time involving the ABA).
15 Donors to some extent also bought into this vision, and continue to do so as regards rule

of law contributions to a "market friendly environment." Even after the somewhat later experience in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union demonstrated that a new legal
framework has little impact on institutionalized behaviors, we continue to promote isolated
legal change in other regions.
16 For example, only a few years following a GAO report roundly criticizing its support to
a regional center for justice reforms (the Costa Rica based ILANUD), the US government, as
part of the Hemispheric summits, backed the creation of another such center, this time in
Santiago Chile. The organization (CEJA, Centro de Estudios de la Justicia de las Americas)
exists to this day, facing many of the problems those involved with ILANUD foresaw. Currently, the ABA and the International Committee of the Federal Judicial Conference are
proposing still a third center, to be located in Puerto Rico.
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national presidents, court leaders, or even civil society groups. Only the forprofit consultants may be more immune to the tendency-as they get paid to
do what others have ordered. Rule of law programs also compete for attention with numerous higher priority initiatives in other sectors and may suffer
either from a resultant decline in attention or measures to shift their direction. Finally, the donor community never seems to stay in one location very
long, shifting its resources and attention en masse to the next crisis site. This
obviously impedes long-term efforts, and seems to be an increasingly common phenomenon in recent years. For example, one wonders how much of
the donor investments recently recommitted to Haiti will actually materialize in the face of the subsequent shift of attention to East Asia in the wake
of the December 26, 2004 tsunami. Given that commitments often seem in
excess of what a country can absorb, the upside to this practice may be to
force a focus on priorities, assuming sufficient funding can be maintained
for this purpose.
Finally, as rule of law programs have become more widely
accepted, those opposing them have often found their best tactic is
undermining from within. Accept the new appointment system, but find
ways to introduce the same political interference it was intended to mitigate.
Acknowledge the new legal rules, but simply work around them. Introduce
the new mechanism but do not give it the necessary funding. Again this is
not unique to judicial reform programs, and has occurred even in areas
where reforms apparently had a higher priority among donors and national
leaders. The financial management and privatization reforms conducted in
the '90s are a prime and increasingly recognized example. Countries took
the hardware, complied with the conditions, but did so in a fashion that too
often undermined the intended effects. Die-hard proponents of the
Washington Consensus, underlying these actions, often complain that the
failings were not in the recommendations but in their insufficient
implementation. If that is true, then they themselves should have paid more
attention to the details of execution-a plan after all is only a paper product
until it is enacted.
Rule of law reforms also were impeded by some problems of their
own, or at least their exaggeration to a point where the differences seem
more qualitative than quantitative. Critics interested in improving future
performance have thus begun to focus on them and three characteristics in
particular: an over-reliance on technological and other quick fixes; a reform
strategy which seemed to accept the underlying system as adequate, and
only in need of better implementation; and excessive promises as to the
beneficial results. Given the weight of the Latin American model in shaping
reforms elsewhere, these merit further discussion.
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B. Tendency to rely on structural,technological,fixes and overlook
the politicaland politicalwill elements

It has become conventional wisdom that too many programs have
been what are uncharitably called "equipment dumps," a host of
technological elements introduced as a means of building capacity in the
target institutions. The larger problem however, and one characterizing
other proposed remedies, has been a tendency to see reform as the nearly
automatic result of the provision of selected inputs-whether material,
structural, or normative. As the list of standard remedies has grown, critics
now speak of Christmas tree reforms-collections of measures, often
introduced in no particular order and with little internal coordination, the
adoption of which is assumed to constitute all that is needed. Collectively
called "capacity building," the underlying notion is that once the capacity is
installed, courts, public defenders, police, and prosecutors will use it to
improve their performance.
The phenomenon is not attributable only to the donors, and it has
produced some results. It would be ludicrous to believe that several hundred
million dollars invested only in equipment, buildings, and laws would leave
the systems unchanged. While the emphasis on technology is often blamed
on large donors, there are countries which have done this on their ownespecially the larger and more developed nations like Brazil, Argentina,
Chile, and Mexico. Automation and related technological innovations
(video-conferencing, barcodes on case files, internet filings) have helped
their courts (and other sector organizations) handle larger caseloads and
reduce some causes of delay, as they have in the less developed court systems where the donors financed the investments. Similarly, purely structural
reforms (reorganizations and the creation of new agencies like public defenders offices, independent public prosecutors, judicial councils), introduction of new services (common intake centers, multi-door courthouses,
ADR), and legal change have emanated from local and external sources, and
have also produced some improvements in productivity, access, and the
quality of output. Results vary by and within countries, but to deny the impact of these innovations would be to ignore the weight of the accumulating
evidence.
The problem, as critics have begun to note, is that enhanced capacity needs to be used. Where judges and judicial leaders are more interested
in getting the new equipment, personnel, and offices than in producing the
results they are supposed to permit, the latter may be quite limited. Judges
who see computers as a way of reducing their own workload or embrace
new codes as a sign of being modern, are unlikely to feel the need to do
anything differently, possibly believing that any improvements will be
automatic. Some proponents of these changes may have believed the same.
Others may have been reluctant to deliver the bad news (you have to change
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what you are doing) with the good (we are giving you 5,000 computer work
stations), trusting that once the new elements were in place they would
spontaneously cause their users to alter their behavior in the desired directions. Resistance to the downstream changes may also come from outside
the courts, from the private bar, from the political leaders, and from others
benefiting from business as usual. Resistance may be motivated by contradictory agendas or by simple inertia.
We take for example the frequent failure of courts to use the new
automated systems (whether established in individual courtrooms to help
judges process their cases, or in the administrative systems to simplify management of resources) to generate management information systems to track
organizational performance at either level. Where they did not do this
manually before (and many judiciaries in the region are sufficiently small
enough to allow this) giving them the tools to do this automatically often
produced no further change. It is still rare to find a judicial leader who can
cite the caseload handled by his courts, knows what individual judges receive and process, or can explain the relationship of resource allocation to
production. If the purpose of these changes was to improve management,
the forgotten element was the often near complete absence of managers to
use them. In the court systems or individual courts where more happened,
this was inevitably because leaders and staff recognized and embraced the
potential. However, this was also true of the occasional court which even in
an otherwise dysfunctional traditional system, worked above the norm before any changes were made.
The fate of other kinds of innovations (new laws, new organizations, new services) has all too often had similar effects for similar reasons.
Where nothing is changed but the law, nothing may actually change. Colombia recently put into effect its third new Criminal Procedures Code since
1991. It and its predecessors were introduced as a means of fighting impunity, reducing human rights abuses, and combating crime-responding to
the three most common public complaints. This time the law's drafters
again say they have a better product, but again seem to be relying on legal
change to improve well entrenched behavior patterns, inadequate organizational structures, irrational distribution of resources, scant coordination
within or among institutions, and a host of other problems. Aside from a
mass training program for judicial operators in the principles of the new
code and a push to build rooms for oral hearings, there appears17to be no
concerted plan for addressing the other long-standing weaknesses.
17

In fact some of the weaknesses continue to be denied or ignored. One of the Colombian

code's authors, Jaime Enrique Granados Pena, speaking in a World Bank course Reforma
Judicialpara Bolivia, Ecuadory Guatemala on January 19, 2005, noted that the country the
country was indeed increasing its number of public defenders over the current 1,000. Jaime
Enrique Granados Pena, Address at the World Bank Course: Reforma Judicial para Bolivia,
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In other countries, a push to expand access seems to overlook one
of the biggest obstacles-the legal requirement than anyone heard by a
court be represented by counsel. Programs have been mounted to provide
free legal services, but in countries with high degrees of poverty and many
competing budgetary demands, there are few that seem capable of providing
enough. However, the private bar has frequently opposed any waiving of the
requirement inasmuch as it would cut into its own income.1 8 While lawyers
and judges eventually accepted ADR, much as they did automation, court
annexed and stand alone programs all too frequently become another expensive obstacle for anyone attempting to access the courts. Access is a major
problem in Latin America, but it has been attacked in an entirely nonstrategic fashion, defining the solution as simply getting more people to
courts or alternative services. Given the size of the population of potential
beneficiaries and budgetary limitations, this clearly is not an adequate strategy, either in terms of how many will be benefited or in ensuring that the
most important needs are met.
In just about every area where programs usually focus, similar stories could be told. Donors have contributed by giving the impression that
such targeted additions would resolve problems automatically. In most
cases, it appears they believed this was so. Courts have gone along because
they often shared the same impression that improvements only required
adopting a new mechanism, often fully funded by donor programs. And
national governments have often cooperated in their own fashion, buying
the argument that the main obstacle to improved performance was the lack
of adequate funding. As Latin American judicial budgets now approach
world record levels (as percentages of total government expenditures) and
user satisfaction shows little or no improvement-in some cases it appears
to have declined-Ministers of Finance are beginning to ask the obvious
questions, for which the courts' usual answer is "we still don't have
enough." Insuring that inputs are better coordinated, that output goals are
understood, and that judicial operators move toward meeting them by
changing how they act would be an important step in realizing the potential
of the newly installed capacity. However, there are also indications that
even this will be insufficient because of how the goals themselves have
been understood.
Ecuador y Guatemala (Jan. 19, 2005). However, as World Bank and USAID consultants who
have reviewed Columbia's public defense system note, all defenders are contracted, allowed
to do outside work, and consequently handle an average annual workload of between 30 and
80 cases. This is between one eighth and one third of international standards. It is also believed that as defenders select their cases, they pick the easy ones.
18 Brazil, the one country in the region that introduced pro se representation in a new level
of small claims courts, continues to face resistance from the national bar association (Ordem
de Advogados do Brasil, OAB) which many believe will eventually reverse the policy.
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C. Tendency to see performance improvement as a question of doing more of the same better
Even in systems which have used the changes to raise production
levels, tracking the performance of individual judges and pushing them to
move their caseload along, 9 user satisfaction has often not improved. This
is explained by two additional features: the demand has risen still more rapidly than system capacity to respond and many of the traditional factors
lowering the quality of decisions and impeding their final resolution remain
in place. The logic of the traditional reforms, whether aimed at reducing
delay or increasing access, had been to help judicial systems produce more
of the same more rapidly. Usually no one asks whether what the courts always saw represented the best use of their resources, both as regards the
demands entered and their often convoluted trajectories, given the ample
opportunities, for those who could afford them to register protests against
trial court judgments. 20 Courts everywhere are currently facing these questions, and having to consider some difficult trade-offs among the values
involved-access, delay, costs, and quality. The very notion of addressing
them also faces resistance because of its apparent contradiction of the right
to justice. This resistance seems especially strong in Latin America where
even the notion of justice as a "public service" is roundly opposed by many
judges, lawyers, and jurists. 21 Outside allies usually had never thought to
19 Examples include Brazil, Mexico at the federal level, and Colombia. Brazil's system is
the most developed and also includes an effort to measure quality-judges up for promotion
are invited to submit examples of their written opinions. A perverse turn here is that trial
judges, assuming their rulings will always be appealed, sometimes pay less attention to the
outcome than to the creativity they can insert. The current President of Brazil's Constitutional Court (Supremo Tribunal Federal) cites an example from his days as a lawyer where a
judge ruled against him and was horrified to learn he would not appeal what even the judge
believed was an unfair, but highly creative decision. Nelson Jobim, 0 Proceso de refroma
sob a 6tica do Judicidrio,in REFORMA DO JUDICIARIO 13-40 (Armando Cautelar Pinheiro ed.,
2003).
20
The new criminal and criminal procedures codes represent an exception on the first
count in regards to their efforts to decriminalize certain actions and provide alternative abbreviated proceedings. However, if anything, they have augmented the potential for questioning decisions, an intentional benefit for the mass of ordinary defendants who suffered the
most abuses, but one which has arguably worked most to the advantage of those accused of
white collar crimes.
21 An earlier World Bank publication, Maria Dakolias, The JudicialSector in Latin America and the Caribbean: Elements of Reform (World Bank, Technical Paper No. 319, 1996),
has been the focus of considerable criticism in Brazil for just this approach and its emphasis
on economic impacts, deemed to be a World Bank effort to force globalization and put the
judiciary at its service. As the World Bank does not have a judicial reform project in Brazil,
the criticism seems somewhat exaggerated. For a different type of criticism of the efficiency
approach, see Lawrence Tshuma, The PoliticalEconomy of the World Bank's Legal Framework for Economic Development, in GOVERNANCE, DEVELOPMENT AND GLOBALIZATION: A
TRIBUTE To LAWRENCE TSHUMA 7-27 (Julio Faundez et al. eds., 2000).
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ask about content-assuming this was none of their business or was no different from what courts received everywhere. And finally, the lack of good
statistics even on the basics of caseload meant that at best one had to rely on
anecdotes to make any evaluation.
Our increasing familiarity with the region's courts, the efforts of a
few judiciaries to examine their workloads, and the work of a few academics, research foundations, and donors have begun to suggest that the supplydemand gap is not going to be fixed with efficiency measures alone, and
that if one really wants to increase access to nontraditional users, some of
the traditional ones may have to be discouraged or lose their rights to endless reviews. The situation varies by country, and indeed in the least developed ones, any supply-demand gap could be addressed over the short run by
redistributing caseloads and monitoring performance better. In countries
where judges average only a few hundred filings a year, poor work habits,
incentives, and insufficient supervision are the best explanations of why
productivity is so low, and also go a long way toward explaining additional
problems-poor quality of decisions, corruption, and highly inequitable
access. However, even here patterns evident in the more overloaded court
systems give pause for thought. The following list indicates some recent
findings as to what Latin American courts process and how they do this, and
comprises a starting point for asking how both might be changed.
* Many filings never progress further than admission, abandoned by
the parties for a variety of reasons. However, they usually remain in judicial
offices for some time and are counted as part of the normal caseloadmeaning inter alia, that real workload is often far less than claimed.
* A majority of filings often represent very simple cases, collection
of small debts, noncontroversial actions requiring only judicial recognition
of a title or other document, and in a growing number of countries, routine
claims against government agencies or consumer complaints.
* In more congested systems, judges may reach initial decisions
fairly rapidly, but final disposition is delayed by multiple appeals. Delays in
reaching initial rulings may be a result of the common practices of attending
to interlocutory appeals first.
e Final disposition in cases where a payment is due are often held
up by a judicial collection process which may take longer than the judgment, if it actually results in payment. Court backlogs often have a large
component of adjudicated cases awaiting enforcement and most of these are
in turn paralyzed (i.e. require no judicial action) because of problems in
identifying debtors' assets (usually the responsibility of the creditor).
e Although they frequently complain about court delays when they
are the plaintiffs, large repeat users, including the government, public utilities, non-financial commercial firms, and banks increasing use the opportunity for dilatory practices to their advantage as defendants.
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e Although current law often allows judges to refuse obvious dilatory practices, fear of complaints or accusations of corruption as well as
simple inertia discourage them from doing so. Government attorneys often
enter appeals they know they will lose because the law requires them to do
so, or makes it more difficult not to.
e Default judgments and settlements are either not allowed or not
encouraged. Cases may go through a full "trial" even when the defendant
22
never appears. As one U.S. judge put it, speaking of another region, but
equally applicable to Latin America, the judges "work too hard," putting
equal effort into cases not meriting that much attention.
The situation varies and some of the examples given above have
only been tracked in a few countries. However, across the board, judicial
caseloads in Latin America tend to be largely composed of a few types of
very simple conflicts, some of which arguably should not require judicial
treatment, and others of which do not benefit much from it, given that the
underlying issue is neither legal nor factual but instead is the defendant's
inability or unwillingness to honor a debt or other obligation. The normal
efficiency measures (courtroom reorganizations, automated case files and
tracking systems, improved archiving systems, even internet filings) might
make some difference, especially in courtrooms so overloaded that cases
simply get lost in the shuffle. They can do little against delays caused by
legal procedures, litigant abuses, or defendants unable to pay obligations.
This suggests several conclusions. First, further procedural reforms
may be required, but ways to ensure they are enforced are also needed. So
long as judges have no incentive or power to discipline bad faith litigation,
this is not going to happen. Latin Americans have resisted some of the obvious changes (e.g. restrictions of appeals, their concentration at the end of a
case, judges ability to declare parties in contempt) because they believe the
existing proceedings protect due process rights. In effect they seem to protect them only for those able to hire a good lawyer, and are often used, quite
blatantly to avoid rather than obtain justice. 23 These same protections, expanded in the new criminal procedures codes, have met similar criticisms
and have further reduced public confidence in the system when they see a

22
In the still largely written civil justice systems, a trial, as a concentrated presentation of
arguments and evidence rarely occurs. Instead, the proceedings involve a lengthy written
exchange, possibly with a series of hearings, often over a long period of time.
23
Lawyers interviewed in conjunction with World Bank research in Mexico, Argentina,
and Peru referred to their ability to "buy time" for defendants in debt collection cases. As the
interviews were conducted confidentially, names are not provided, but World Bank, Report
No. 22635-ME, The Juicio Ejecutivo Mercantil in the FederalDistrict Courts of Mexico: A
Study of the Uses and Users of Justice and Their Implicationsfor JudicialReform 49 (2002)
[hereinafter Report No. 22635-ME] references the discussions in Mexico.
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notorious "crook" get off because his lawyer managed to string out the proceedings until the legal deadlines expired.
Second, judges, citizens, and politicians are going to have to take a
second look at what courts are handling and what they ought to handle. In
countries where up to a fourth of the judicial workload is composed of noncontroversial registration of documents, this arguably should be treated in
some other way. Where debt collection, routine administrative protests, and
consumer complaints increasingly congest the courts, administrative or extra-judicial handling should be considered. In a majority of these cases, the
defendant is at most buying time, as the direction of the ruling is not in
question. In Mexico's debt collection proceedings, we found 90 to 95 percent of the rulings in favor of the creditor.24 In Sdo Paulo's (Brazil) small
claims courts seeing federal pension cases, the presiding judge estimated
that only one quarter of the cases involved real conflicts-the rest were
simply a result of the Social Security Office's efforts to control its cash flow
by not recognizing legitimate claims.25 A study conducted by Rio de Janeiro's state Superior Court produced similar findings on consumer complaints directed against public utilities and banks.26 These complaints do
need resolution, but handling them on a one-by-one basis within the courts
is a recipe for judicial gridlock. Legal change including provisions to fine
agencies that indulge in routine abuses, better administrative dispute
mechanisms, and strengthening of administrative regulatory agencies might
all be considered, but simply hoping that increased judicial efficiency will
overcome the problem seems unrealistic.
Third, before proceeding with the non-strategic access policies,
courts and political leaders need a better handle on the needs of nontraditional users. Here, again the goal of giving every citizen his or her day
in court for whatever conflict he or she might like resolved is not realistic.
The questions are what the courts can and should see, and how other types
of conflicts might be handled and other needs resolved. This leads to a third
error of the current strategies, the expectation of a judicial solution for every
social ill, as discussed further below.

24

Report No. 22635-ME, supra note 23, at ii; World Bank, Report No. 26966, An Analysis

of Court Users and Uses in Two Latin American Countries 76 (2003); World Bank, Report
No. 26261-BR, Brazil: Judicial Performance and Private Sector Impacts: Findings from
World Bank Sponsored Research (2003).
25 World Bank, Report No. 32789-BR, Making Justice Count: Measuring and Improving
Judicial Performance in Brazil 63 (2004).
26 PODER JUDICIARIO: TRIBUNAL DA JUSTIUA DO RIO DE JANEIRO (2004).

CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.

[Vol. 38:63

D. Tendency of over-reliance on judicial/ruleof law reform to resolve deep seatedsocio-economic andpoliticalproblems
These programs owe their existence and persistence to the many
promises their promoters have made, from their beneficial results in jumpstarting an economy to their ability to undo deep-seated social injustices.
The promises have brought enormous benefits for those of us working in the
areas, 27 but we are facing an equally enormous problem-the failure to deliver. Moreover, efforts to realize them, especially in the social justice area,
may now be adding their own complications.
As regards the entire argument, I agree with a Peruvian expert, Luis
Pdsara, 28 who has warned several times that we are creating false expectations. In the economic area he argues, apparently in a contradictory fashion,
that judicial reform has no necessary connection to economic growth, although there are clearly areas where specific judicial practices may create
obstacles. The apparent contradiction disappears on closer examination.
What he is really saying is that anything that we may choose to call reform
will not necessarily improve the "market enabling environment." To the
extent we want our reforms to do so we need to understand and attack the
context-specific impediments. His argument as regards to social and political problems is a bit broader, but boils down to the following. Such problems are complex, have deep societal roots and will not be resolved by legal
or judicial fiat. Societies' abilities to address these problems are limited by
available resources, the countervailing power structure, and simple human
possibilities. Many "judicial reformers" are not really interested in judicial
reform, but rather in using whatever judicial structure exists to advance social agendas. They are issue advocates, not proponents of institutional development and in fact often believe they can achieve their goals with stroke
of the pen reforms (much like the economists enamored of the one-off
changes of the Washington Consensus). Despite the terminology, social
injustice has less to do with justice than with politics, and will be best addressed through the latter. Revolutions by judicial order are few 29and far
between, and usually only legalize trends that are already underway.
The consequently excessive optimism about the benefits of rule of
law reforms is an increasing concern to those promoting them because of
the danger of the chits being called in. As regards the economic benefits,
27

Not the least of which is not having to justify the programs. We start with the mantra

that a well functioning court system is a precondition for a well-functioning economy and the
economists leave us alone.
28
See Louis Pdsara, Lecciones aprendidas o por aprender?, in EN BUSCA DE UNA
JUSTICIA DISTINTA: EXPERIENCIAS DE REFORMA EN AMtRICA LATtNA (Luis P~isara ed., 2004).
29 Recent discussion in the U.S. over the implications of Brown v. Board of Education of
Topeka offers a good example.
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China remains the favorite contrary example, but there are others as well.
Brazil's judicial system is certainly problematic, but Brazil has been the
poster child of direct foreign investment for many years. Chile's better
judicial system may appear to support the thesis, but critics argue that the
key there is a markedly, possibly excessively, pro-business cast. Peru grew
spectacularly during the 1990s when its judicial system was pervaded by
corruption and political intervention. Even Singapore, the entrepreneur's
darling, has a very efficient system, absolutely controlled from the top. The
general rule is that business goes where it can make a profit, and resolves its
legal problems by avoidance, or with the help of a good local lawyer, and if
need be, a few well-placed bribes. One critic has in fact suggested that wellmeaning reformers will only complicate the situation by introducing
practices and laws businesses neither want nor need. 30 Certainly, until neoinstitutionalism's discovery of the importance of institutions,3 1 most
interpretations of pro-market legal change suggested that historically, the
enlightened businesses came first and then promoted the changes they
wanted. No one had ever argued that the process worked in the reverse
direction. It might, but that remains to be demonstrated.
Social justice is a more complex problem, with equally mixed results. Latin America saw, as part of the democratic transition, the drafting of
a mass of constitutions promising rights unimagined anywhere, and certainly not in the region's own history. More independent courts, and in
some cases, Public Ministries (Brazil) have begun to order their enforcement, although often on a case-by-case basis. Further complications originate from a tendency to recognize a series of acquired rights-in effect the
entitlements gained by social groups, often members of the middle class,
under prior regimes. With these rights left in force, and new rights more
often recognized, the countries are finding themselves in a financial trap-ordered to recognize new claimants but unable to touch the benefits of established groups. The possibility of renegotiating acquired rights is usually
not admitted, although a few countries (Brazil) have found a judicial solution by denying that certain entitlements (in this case the tax-exempt status
of pensions) are actually rights.32
As more countries are adopting class-action like proceedings, the
resulting financial liabilities from rights cases are becoming still more
problematic. The old, highly unfair system of case-by-case resolution is
gradually disappearing, but greater justice imposes greater costs on
30

JOHN HEWKO, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: DOES THE RULE OF LAW MATTER? (Carne-

gie Endowment for Int'l Peace, Working Paper No. 26, 2002).
31 See DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE (James Alt & Douglass North eds., 1990).
32 For Brazil, absent constitutional change, this may be the only realistic tactic as the Constitution specifically protects acquired rights.
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government. Again in Brazil, the government recently (November, 2004)
made a last ditch, and unsuccessful, effort to oppose a constitutional
amendment it had originally backed-whereby a decision by the
Constitutional Court on a common complaint would be binding on all
similar cases, and in fact on the administrative offices involved. If enacted
as intended, this apparently minor change is likely to bankrupt the
government, which until now had depended on claimants having to litigate
the cases one-by-one. Brazil, if an extreme case, is hardly unique. Litigation
to gain constitutionally guaranteed rights is a growing phenomenon
throughout the region and governments are increasingly pressed as to how
they will deal with the consequences. Courts have outlawed changes to
pension plans (Colombia), ordered provision of housing to the homeless
(Argentina), reversed reductions in force associated with privatizations
(Peru), and nullified civil service legislation intended to link pay and tenure
to performance and facilitate dismissals of redundant or non-performing
employees (Paraguay). The legality and "justice" of the decisions are
usually above question. The problem is how governments will respond
without breaking the bank.
The familiar refrain (also evoked by courts requiring higher budgets) that more efficient use of resources will provide the solution is just not
good enough. There are limits to what a country, and especially a very poor
one, can provide. There are also limits to how much it can demand from the
better off citizens without provoking a coup or their simple departure. In
many of the region's countries, anyone with a fortune worth protecting has
already sent as much as they can to foreign banks or off-shore investments.
Redistribution of wealth, income, and opportunities to gain each are clearly
needed, but history tells us this must go slowly. Turning the matter to the
courts, unprepared to foretell the consequences, often uncertain of the issues
at stake, and themselves with a questioned legitimacy does not appear to be
the best answer. However, politicians have sometimes been willing to do so,
largely because they do not want to have the responsibility themselves.
Thus, the final element of the exaggerated promises has been a tendency to judicialization of politics in the absence of political mechanisms to
make the hard choices. Courts have varied in their willingness to jump into
the breech. Three years after the fact, Argentina's Supreme Court has yet to
decide on the legality of the De la Rua administration's freezing and then
pesification 33 of bank accounts in dollars. It is predicted that Brazil's Constitutional Court will be very wary about its new ability to fix interpretations
of laws involving constitutional rights given the enormous financial repercussions. However, until recently, it decided on conversion rates for state
33 Pesification means the conversion of dollar amounts, originally calculated at par to
roughly 1.4 pesos to the dollar (in the face of an official exchange of roughly three to one).
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pensions and mortgages (affected by devaluations) entirely on its own and
without any input from the Ministry of Finance.34 Costa Rica's Supreme
Court had no problem nullifying the national traffic law (for two years) but
resisted declaring the Central Bank's setting of the exchange rate a violation
of the Congress' law making monopoly. Courts are learning, but the existing rights-rich constitutional framework does not allow them a lot of leeway. From the Cinderellas of the public sector, Courts are emerging to a
central position, but without much opportunity to adjust to the new demands, and in many cases without much internal reform. Not only are they
being pressed to put their own houses in order; they are increasingly made
responsible for major political decisions. This may be only a Latin American syndrome (one hopes). It is a cautionary lesson for those building judicial systems in other regions. A too rapid increase in responsibilities without
time to absorb the consequences can be a recipe for political and economic
as well as judicial chaos.
IV. EXPERIENCE IN LATIN AMERICAN POST-CONFLICT COUNTRIES

Latin America offers several examples of judicial reforms used in a
post-conflict context, among them Haiti, El Salvador, and Guatemala.3 5 As I
am most familiar with the first two, I will focus this discussion on them. I
simply have not followed the Guatemalan situation closely enough to assess
its advances. The Haitian and El Salvador cases are especially interesting in
that they represent respectively, a clear failure and a relative success. Both
occurred in the context of state failure and extensive civil conflict (in El
Salvador a civil war, in Haiti, a long period of repression, followed by the
externally facilitated reinstatement of an elected government). Both received substantial amounts of external assistance and in both cases, donors
emphasized the central role of the justice system in the state (re)building
exercise. In neither case can we speak of nation building, as the national
identity was not in question. The problem was how to erect a state apparatus
that would be recognized by the majority of the population and capable of
responding to their needs.
That said, Haiti was clearly the more difficult situation, and therein
lie many of the differences in results. In El Salvador, the civil war's conclu34 This rather surprising revelation was made in interviews with Brazilian judges, who said
they also corrected their own "mistakes," again without Finance's input.
35 Published accounts, often critical, of donor programs in these countries are growing, but
El Salvador has been the most thoroughly studied. See MARGARET POPKIN, PEACE WITHOUT
JUSTICE: OBSTACLES TO BUILDING THE RULE OF LAW (2000), for one of the most thorough
treatments. See also Reed Brody, InternationalAspects of Current Efforts at JudicialReform: UnderminingJustice in Haiti, in THE (UN)RULE OF LAW & THE UNDERPRIVILEGED IN
LATIN AMERICA, supra note 4, at 227-42 (offering a somewhat biased, advocate's criticism of

U.S. programs in Haiti).
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sion did not unseat the old elite (their party, ARENA in fact remained in
power through all but the most recent presidential elections), but simply
forced their sharing of power with the insurgent groups. In Haiti, the reinstatement of the Aristide government in 1994, ousted the former military
leadership and many of their political allies. El Salvador's state apparatus
was in better shape prior to the regime shift and was not seriously damaged
by it. In Haiti, a poorly functioning bureaucratic apparatus was further devastated by the change. Finally, El Salvador's economy, while hurt by the
civil war, was relatively strong. Haiti comes close to a country without an
economy, the poorest nation in the Western Hemisphere and one of the most
disadvantaged in the world. Although both economies rely heavily on remittances from displaced populations, in El Salvador these have reached the
furthest corners of the country and produced more productive investments.
The emphasis on the justice sector in both countries was largely a
donor choice. There was a demand in both cases for attention to the security
forces, and an effort to recreate them with substantial donor assistance.
However, the attention to the courts and other sector agencies was largely a
donor priority, although in El Salvador, there were local groups supporting
broader justice reform. In both countries, the entire justice sector was
known for corruption, political intervention, inefficacy, and inadequate resources of every type, although again, the Haitian situation was far worse.
Given these initial differences, the varying outcomes are perhaps no surprise. What is surprising is that the donor tactics in each were so similar:
substantial attention to recreating the police forces, combined with the usual
recipe of remedies for the courts. It also bears mentioning that the process
took 10 to 15 years in El Salvador, beginning in the early 1980s. Defeat was
declared in Haiti after only five, and of course was not solely a question of
failure in the justice sector but of the overall donor assistance programs and
worsening relations between the Haitian government and the main sources
of external assistance.
One would not want to paint too rosy a picture of El Salvador.
Some twenty-plus years after donor assistance began and twelve or so after
the peace accords were signed, its civilian police clearly function better and
its courts are less rift with corruption than before. Still, neither entity, nor
the new public defenders office, public prosecution, or the ombudsman are
models of how such agencies should operate. Citizens' concerns with crime,
public sector and even judicial corruption, poor services, limited access, and
inefficient resource use remain. However, the base is there and there are
local groups working to promote improvements. After donor attention
turned elsewhere, including to Haiti, the Salvadorans have managed to
continue their own reforms, modifying the appointment systems for judges,
combating corruption in the courts and elsewhere, and improving
monitoring of performance. The results are not only far better than those in
Haiti, but also than those in the neighboring Guatemala and Nicaragua,
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where the initial conditions were more similar. So what accounts for the
relative success?
First, the process was gradual, beginning years before the peace accords were signed (1992) and thus giving the local and international reformers more time to understand the problems. By the time of the peace accords,
the early mistakes (some mentioned above) had been recognized and steps
taken to correct them. Second, there were the limited problems of donor
coordination because one donor, the U.S., got there early and maintained the
dominant role in the process for most of its duration. The U.S. certainly
made many mistakes. It was easier to recognize and correct them in the absence of pressure to compete with other sources of assistance. Instead, it
was international NGOs and UN observers who did most of the monitoring-a more objective, or at least less self-interested source of criticism.
Problems did occur when both types of entities began to seek to build their
own programs, but this came relatively late. Third, although the lion's share
of funding went to police, there was a simultaneous and well funded effort
to build the sector's other institutions. And fourth, because this was grant
funded, there was necessarily less emphasis on the big ticket items (computers and buildings) and more on structural and behavioral change. There
was a heavy use of on-site advisors who worked with the individual institutions to identify and resolve performance problems, and an enormous emphasis, especially on the non-police side in making do with existing resources. By the time the IFIs got there with their large loans, much of the
structural change had already been introduced, so attention was only diverted to the development commodities after the fact.
By the time the same donors got to Haiti, and the early steps there
were again led by the USG, they seemed to have forgotten some of the obvious lessons and armed themselves to affect the same reforms in record
time. "Standing up the Haitian justice system" became a political priority,
with the emphasis on producing externally visible results as quickly as possible.3 6 Much was done quickly, but without the benefits of a lengthy period
to understand the overall situation, and in many cases without advisors who
even spoke the local language (French or Creole).37 In El Salvador, local
advisors could and did go out drinking beer with their counterparts at the
end of the day. In Haiti, the majority retired to one of a few tourist hotels
As an anecdotal example, in a meeting of U.S. advisors, one State Department official
noted the need to televise Haitian criminal trials. When it was mentioned that most Haitians
don't have televisions, he simply said, with a wink, that the televised proceedings were not
for Haitian audiences.
37 Although some Haitian-Americans were used as advisors, there were rumored to be
problems with their preservation of contacts in the country. As has proved to be the case
elsewhere, members of the diaspora, while sensitive to local politics and fluent in the language, can also bring their own baggage with them.
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where they hung out with each other. Those who could mix with the locals
often regarded their logical counterparts, probably accurately, as part of the
problem, sometimes referring to them as MRE's, or, morally repugnant elites.38 This was less true of the police advisors, but was an unfortunate fact
of life for those who worked with other sector institutions. Perhaps motivated by the harsher Haitian realities, perhaps by the changed political climate in the U.S., Haiti's justice reforms during the late 1990s encompassed
a perplexing mix on the donor side of a high profile political agenda combined with greater moral outrage.
Ironically (but perhaps of some consolation now), El Salvador's reforms under a U.S. government not noted for its dedication to soft ideals
may have done more than those in Haiti with the collaboration of idealists
drawn from the NGO community. However, it should also be noted that the
more dominant role of police and prosecutorial advisors in Haiti may not
have been an asset as neither group, however skilled in their ordinary functions, seemed to have much of a grasp of institutional reform. It has been
said by others that insufficient attention to creating police management capabilities accounts for subsequent police abuse. Prosecutors sometimes
seemed more intent on helping Haitians resolve specific cases than on building a functioning prosecutorial agency.
The real question in Haiti is whether different tactics might have
produced better and more lasting results. Following the donor exit in the late
1990s, initial achievements in all areas quickly dissipated. The recreated
police force became its own source of corruption and was furthermore understaffed and under-administered for the tasks it faced. 39 Whatever improvements were made in court operations seem not to have lasted any
longer than the computer equipment sent to the Ministry of Justice (and why
anyone would give computer equipment to a country with enormous problems providing electricity, not to mention controlling inventory, is a good
question). As the donor exit was provoked by much broader problems, a
longer term judicial effort was probably foreclosed, but we can still consider
what might have been done, and what might be done now, given donor interest in resuming support.
First, Haiti's judicial system is clearly broken from the top down.
Thus, simply providing the normal court administration support and judicial
training is hardly going to be sufficient. Bottom-up sounds fine but, absent
A play on words from the military's "MRE," or "meals ready to eat."
39 Until well into the program, no one had bothered to calculate how much the new force
would cost. When they did, the result was 65 percent of the national budget. Judging by
those who responded to recruitment calls (a heavy complement of lawyers and even trained
doctors), the "planners" might have guessed they had overestimated salaries, but the realization came too late. In Haiti, $300 a month was a princely fee, and one beyond the ability of
government to pay.
38
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the conversion of leadership, will not achieve much. Much more effort
needs to go to activating leadership in the Ministry of Justice (which currently still oversees courts, prosecution, police, and prisons) and the Supreme Court. In Haiti, the donors worked to some extent with the Ministry,
but largely ignored the Court, arguably a critical oversight in their program.
Second, the judicial problem is simply too large to resolve over even the
medium run. Hence, efforts must be made to distinguish the essential from
the "merely" desirable. The essential in this case was creating a counterbalance to the new police force (and also strengthening the latter's own administrative and oversight capabilities) and a system that could handle major
crimes. This might imply a focus on Port-au-Prince and a few other urban
centers to the detriment of the dream of providing an honest justice of the
peace in every hamlet. This is my own guess in the Haitian situation; others
might differ, and certainly it is not intended as a general rule. However, in
Haiti in the mid 1990s and today, crime and especially violent, organized
crime is the largest concern, seconded by a police force which is allegedly
involved in its perpetration.
Third, and although this has not been a major line of thought in
Haiti, as of yet, the creation of special reconciliation or truth commissions
might be put on the back burner. This is again my personal prejudice, but
such activities appear to take more time and absorb more resources than
they might merit. Resolving the problems of the past may be important, but
for any country facing a nation or state building effort, the present and the
future are more critical. Finally, and as some consolation to those who may
have objected to my second point, if one wants to have a national organization (or as in Haiti, already has one, however poorly functioning) one needs
national presence and the creation of an institutional monitoring capacity. In
Haiti, both were logically unrealistic, but this means that the bulk of judges
(justice of the peace, often untrained, sometimes illiterate) were still "out
there," doing whatever they had normally done. Standing up this system
was a logistical nightmare, but some early attention should have gone to
detecting the worst problems and taking some steps to resolve them. This,
however, requires time, and there simply was too little of that.
It is interesting that in Haiti (and in El Salvador) while the donors
insisted on the recreation of the police, the judges and prosecutors were left
in place. In El Salvador the Truth Commission had in fact strongly recommended the replacement of the Supreme Court. The government refused to
do so on the grounds that the move would be unconstitutional. 4° Over time,
but well into the 1990s, a new appointment system brought the selection of
40
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a new Supreme Court and added more judges, while the worst of the lot
were eventually removed for cause through the new evaluation and disciplinary system. In conjunction with reforms attempted in other countries (Peru,
the Dominican Republic), seated judges at all levels have been forced to
recompete for their positions in order to hold legal appointments under the
new system. It is hard to draw any conclusions from such a short and disparate set of examples, but in these and other countries, efforts to fix the system by replacing all the judges have generally not been very successful. Of
the four mentioned, only the Dominican Republic seems to contradict that
finding, and even here, the process was gradual. Peru seems to have made a
habit of massive judicial purges and each time judicial credibility declines
further. Because the problem often is not just the judges, but the entire legal
culture, newcomers quickly adopt old vices unless the rest of the system is
changed as well. Hence, despite the frequent sense that the judges are too
corrupt to keep, it may be best to take the logical corollary actions more
slowly.
V. LESSONS FOR EFFORTS IN OTHER REGIONS AND FOR NATION BUILDING
PROGRAMS

So, what does the experience tell us for the much more difficult task
of nation as well as state building in other regions? The first and most obvious lesson is to assume this is a slow process. Even with all its additional
disadvantages, a program in Haiti with adequate funding over a 15 year
period might well have provided more lasting results. The same amount of
funding spread out over that long a period would arguably have been more
effective. The usual donor tendency to congregate in a country and insert
enormous amounts of funding all at once is simply counter-productive, and
the waste is compounded by an equally rapid exit. When there is so much
money to spend, much of it goes for less necessary items-buildings, expensive training programs, extensive automation-none of which, as we
have seen, automatically leads to improvements in output, and some of
which might be more productively invested in other sectors or in other
countries. More time is not a sufficient condition. It certainly is a necessary
one.
A second lesson, visible in the two examples, and strengthened by
comparisons with past and on-going efforts in other state or nation building
programs, 4 ' is that while the ultimate objectives may be similar, countries
start in very different places and with very different complements of re41 My own experience here is limited to brief experiences in Cambodia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. It has been enriched by conversations with World Bank and
USAID colleagues working in other regions, especially Afghanistan, Iraq, Kosovo, East
Timor, and Bosnia.
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sources and obstacles. The programmatic context is critical and should be
understood to include not only the situation of the justice sector, but also the
overall socio-political environment and the contributions of the outside participants. Ignoring these contextual variables can lead to serious strategic
errors (e.g. attempting an accelerated, Salvador style program in a country
like Haiti). The list of potentially relevant factors is virtually limitless. A
few worth special attention are as follows:
* Has political power actually changed hands or are those who formerly held control still on top? This is the difference between a Salvador or
a Cambodia and a Haiti, but there are a range of additional variations. They
will affect the program's ability to make major changes in the structure,
operations, and values of the justice sector.
e How much change has occurred in the overall state apparatus?
How strong was it to start, and how strong is it now? It is one thing to work
in the context of a functioning, if flawed state, and another to do so where
the state has collapsed or has never had much national reach beyond a few
urban centers.
e Is there a functioning judiciary or conflict resolution mechanism,
and is it regarded as legitimate, and by whom? Given the political and economic costs of building a new system, it may be more practical to work with
what is there, and what is there should be taken to include less formal dispute resolution arrangements. Over the short to medium run, the latter may
be the best services for rural populations, and eventually may be more formally appended to the official system. 42 Special problems may occur in divided nations where what exists is regarded as legitimate only by a part of
the population-or as in some countries, there are multiple systems each
regarded as legitimate by only part of the population.
e Is there a demand for modifying, expanding, or altering the operations of whatever justice system exists, from whom does it come, and is
there a consensus on the new directions? Are there additional needs, possibly not automatically connected to justice operations that might be addressed under the existing or new system? Often the demand for change
comes from small, if powerful groups, while those with needs that might be
addressed do not articulate the connection.
* What goals and visions do donors bring to the table, and what resources lie behind them? Donors and other outside participants often, it
should be mentioned, assume they are working with a tabula rasa or with a
42
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more "modem" arrangement. For years the Peruvian judiciary opposed the country's lay
justices of the peace, recommending their replacement with accredited attorneys. However,
the lay justices remain the most popular part of the country's justice system, and arguably a
turn to a more lawyerly approach would be less attractive to the communities who use them.
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mandate for change that may be far shallower than they imagine. They also
can be overly ambitious about what can be charged or built and about the
legitimacy that may be accorded to their visions.
There are two common errors as regards the reform context: to assume it is like any other or to assume it is so unique as to obviate lessons
from elsewhere. What is similar and what is unique are judgment calls, and
making them requires knowledge of both the immediate context and of others' experience. The only certainty is that once someone starts making either of the extreme claims, they are probably on the wrong track.
A third lesson is the need to prioritize. Although Latin America has
not faced a nation building challenge, the state building efforts do contain
some of the former's elements-the need to create a judicial system that
responds to the preferences and demands of a very diverse population. Failure to do so in Latin American would not have meant the dissolution of the
state; it might have meant the illegitimacy of the system created. However,
everything cannot be done at once. In El Salvador, the emphasis on the
criminal justice system, while first responding to a less deeply based interest
in protecting human rights, turned out to be fortuitous because of the postcivil war increase in criminal activity. The codes were not designed for this
purpose, and subsequently suffered some modifications (to make them "less
soft on crime"). However, the organizations created to apply them were
very much needed. This was a popular priority and it was one that maintained interest in and support for the program. The emphasis on combating
judicial corruption and depoliticizing appointments also touched local concerns and thus generated another constituency for sustaining the changes.
While Haiti's police rebuilding efforts did constitute a priority, the judicial
part of the program never seemed to find its principal focus. Instead, the
goal was capacity building, with the "for what" part of the formula left unanswered. Capacity building is not an objective; it is a means, and there the
"for what" question is the key.
A fourth lesson thus is to select priorities on the basis of local demand, and not what outsiders prefer. If the concern is crime, then crime
should be the emphasis; if it is resolving a myriad of smaller disputes that
might escalate into major conflicts then it should be there. If it is land ownership, because of multiple claims on the same pieces of real estate or lack
of title, then that should be the focus. It is important to know what citizens
expect to get from their justice systems and what they believe they are not
receiving. The answers to those questions (see below) may not have feasible
solutions, but they are a start. However, two further cautions are in order.
One is to avoid building greater demand for justice before the system is
capable of providing a response. The second is to avoid building a demand
for services it does not offer.
The fundamental role of judicial systems is resolving conflicts in an
authoritative fashion and so reducing their chances of further escalation.
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Secondary functions, not recognized in many countries, are restricting government abuses of its authority and helping citizens access positive rights
guaranteed to them by government. Where these latter functions have never
been acknowledged, it is advisable to move into them slowly to avoid harm
to the plaintiffs or to the judicial officials who try to break new ground. As
one example, in El Salvador, where the rights discourse was more accepted,
the new public defenders quite successfully contested illegal detentions and
got their clients out of jail, even while awaiting trial. During the same period (early1990s) in Cambodia, the defenders' goal was to get judges to
sentence their clients for time served in pre-trial detention. Getting a judge
to admit that the defendant was not guilty, let alone securing a pre-trial release, was simply too much to ask.43 The advocate's approach is usually full
speed ahead. Building sustainable institutions is a more incremental process.
The idea should be to start with what works now, gradually expand it, and
over time add new functions. Demand building also should be incremental
so as to ensure it pushes institutions forward by steps, rather than over the
brink. Outside observers are sometimes reluctant to admit that some things
do work in a local justice system-they may not work as the outsiders
would prefer, but it is local preferences that count first. One does not build
legitimacy by rejecting all local values, hard as some of them may be to
swallow. 44
A fifth, related lesson is not to overburden the system with responsibilities for resolving essentially political disputes. If the courts still lack
legitimacy, they are not going to get it by weighing in on matters where the
rules of the game are not yet established. Even if they enjoy legitimacy with
the locals, if not with the external advisors, they will be limited as to how
far they can go into the political arena. In Latin America, politicians have
recently taken to passing political disputes on to the courts, because they do
not want to face the hard issues. As discussed earlier, entering into this
arena is a bad choice for the judges. The issues are usually not fundamentally legal ones, and the courts are neither empowered nor prepared to decide on any other basis. It is a little disturbing that external advisors con43 Information from the author's experience in El Salvador with the defenders program;
Interview with Defenders in Cambodia, Cambodia (1995).
44 As another anecdotal example, when Costa Rican staff from ILANUD first went to
Bolivia to start a public defenders program, they decided to emphasize gender sensitivity
first. The Bolivian audience (largely male) laughed them off the podium. As defense was in
itself a new concept, it proved more practical to skip the gender elements initially and focus
on establishing the principle that defendants, of which ever gender, deserved counsel. It also
bears mentioning that the Costa Ricans had no prior experience in Bolivia, didn't understand
the gender situation there, and thus had no idea as to the real problems or the resistance they
would face. A similar tack was tried by USAID in Cambodia, where the first incursion into
police reform (and police in Cambodia need lots of it) was to be a course in gender sensitivity. I unfortunately have no idea whether it was pursued, and if so, with what effects.
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tinue to see justice reform as a means of effecting social revolution. The
presumed opportunity to right decades if not centuries of social and political
wrongs simply flies in the face of historical experience, and is increasingly
resisted in countries where it is attempted by outsiders. Much like the old
saw about giving a person fish or teaching her to catch them, there is a
choice between building institutions or using what is there to pursue other
objectives. The alternatives are not entirely compatible, and those preparing
programs should be aware of this fact.
A sixth and final lesson is not to undertake anything a country cannot sustain financially once the donors go home. The more aid money is
available the more grandiose the donors' plans, but they will leave sooner or
later and the question is what the country will really be able to support.
Salaries are the fundamental issue here. There are also details like upkeep
on buildings and equipment, or even the cost of materials (gas, toner, paper)
needed to use them. Even in Latin American countries with wealthier governments, sustainability of many innovations has been a problem, and this is
not only because of executive priorities, but also because of how the courts
manage their own funds. Unfortunately, countries lacking adequate justice
systems usually have any number of other urgent needs, many of which will
(and possibly should) take precedence over the courts when funding decisions are made. If justice reforms are designed on the basis of what donors
will fund, not what will be financed afterwards, the danger is not only that
services will decline. The entire logic of the reformed system may also collapse leading to still further problems.
Because Latin America was the first of the developing regions to
embark on the latest round of justice reforms, it provides a variety of increasingly documented examples of what can be done, with what immediate
results, and with what longer term impacts. Not all of this may be easily
transferable to the current group of nation and state building efforts. However, greater familiarity with the Latin American experience may help avoid
some common mistakes and also provide ideas as to alternative ways to
tackle common problems. The Latin American challenge was in many
senses far easier-not only because of the acceptance of a common national
identify and some sort of state authority-but also because it often had
longer to work its changes, and of course could usually do so in a relatively
peaceful environment. It may be most useful at the level of designing inputs, the famous building blocks of reform. However, it is also well to remember that after twenty years of "capacity building" the potency of the
building blocks is now very much in doubt. Latin American reformers too
often forgot the importance of politics, culture, and hidden agendas in their
fascination with delivering inputs. They are now facing the additional challenge of making those inputs work to produce improved services. In nations
under threat of further collapse such luxuries of a second chance may not be
available. Hence, it may be well from the start to understand that while
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buildings, computers, new laws, and training can advance a reform agenda,
they are not the heart of the matter. The real challenge is to change behaviors within and outside the sector, and for that to function, it is important to
understand what the various stakeholders want and to work on changing
their perceptions of their needs and possibilities.

